Dis-information and mis-information
Module 2: Digital attacks and Online Gender-Based Violence
Overview
- Threats to journalism: the pervasive information disorders that have severely disrupted societies around the world in recent years, including mis- and disinformation, are “multi-pronged and intersecting threats” that impact journalists, their safety and security, and their ability to do their jobs in various ways.(1) Misinformation and disinformation are defined by UNESCO as follows:
- Disinformation: Information that is false is disseminated by a person who knows it is false. “It is a deliberate, intentional lie, and points to people being actively disinformed by malicious actors.”(2)
- Misinformation: Misinformation is information that is false, but the person who is disseminating it believes that it is true.
- Mistrust in the media: At a passive level, the proliferation of mis- and disinformation online has contributed to a growing sense of mistrust among the general public in journalism and news as a whole and has made it harder for credible information produced by journalists to compete in the heavily saturated information eco-system.(3)
- Targets: In addition, mis- and disinformation campaigns are actively used to target journalists in order to deter participation in the public sphere, silence their reporting, and punish criticism, with “serious consequences for human rights, diversity in public debates and the media, and ultimately, democracy and development.”(4) The UNSR on FreeEx has observed that journalists are increasingly facing “smear campaigns [that] have become more pernicious on social media networks.”(5)
The impact of mis- and disinformation is compounded by several factors:
- Gender dynamics: The UNSR on FreeEx highlighted the insidious nature of gendered disinformation, which not only spreads falsehoods but also utilizes highly emotive and context‑specific content to undermine women’s credibility, competence, and societal standing.(6) These campaigns often sexualize women journalists, attacking their character, appearance, and intelligence to discredit their reporting and deter their continued work. Targeted disinformation tactics are also used to silence, delegitimize, and devalue women in positions of power across politics, media, entertainment, and activism.
- The legacy of colonialism: In Africa, disinformation campaigns frequently employ anti-colonialism narratives to undermine women’s rights activists and imply their opposition to decolonial efforts and ties to Western influences.(7) Sub-Saharan African women are disproportionately affected by online gender-based abuse fuelled by disinformation, with a UNESCO-ICFJ survey revealing that 41% of respondents, including women journalists, attributed their experiences of online violence to orchestrated disinformation campaigns. (8)In the region, online gendered disinformation tactics have been used particularly during critical national or public interest moments, including during elections and the COVID-19 pandemic. Such disinformation campaigns frequently weaponised gender narratives, sexualising them and attacking their character and credibility.(9)
- Evolving digital landscape: Concerningly, with the evolution of digital tools, artificial intelligence technologies have now become an ingrained feature of this form of online violence, with deep fakes surfacing as a preferred form of malicious misrepresentation. According to the International Centre for Journalists, “[t]he perpetrators range from individual misogynists and networked mobs [including anonymous trolls])… to State-linked disinformation agents aiming to undercut press freedom and chill critical journalism through orchestrated attacks.”(10)
Gendered disinformation manifests in various ways and amplifies OGBV
In its submissions to the UNSR on FreeEx for her report on gendered disinformation, South African civil society organisation Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) referenced several local examples of how gendered disinformation manifests:(11)
- Targeted attacks against female journalists: Journalist Ferial Haffajee faced online dissemination of manipulated images, often portraying her in sexualized contexts, falsely insinuating connections with specific businessmen and government officials. Similarly, journalist Qaanitah Hunter was targeted on X (formerly Twitter) by politicians, accusing her of spreading lies and being financially supported by a “Master.”
- Legal attacks and disinformation campaigns: Journalist Karyn Maughan encountered attempts to silence her through a SLAPP suit, which not only aimed to intimidate her legally but also served as a platform for online bullying and attacks against her. MMA explained that the weaponization of the legal system appears to be intertwined with disinformation campaigns, often with gendered implications.
- Disinformation targeting the LGBTQI community: MMA found that gendered disinformation intersects with the targeting of LGBTQI community members. For instance, a fabricated article purportedly authored by openly gay journalist Eusebius McKaiser was circulated containing homophobic content aimed at exploiting the journalist’s profile to disseminate disinformation against the LGBTQI community.
MMA provided further examples of how disinformation can form part of or magnify different forms of OGBV for example:
- Manipulated content: Instances such as Haffajee’s experience reflect a growing trend of technology-manipulated content, including images, text, videos, or audio, being disseminated without the consent of the depicted individual. MMA submitted that cyber-misogynistic attacks are strategically employed to silence journalists.
- Threats and incitement: MMA highlighted recent tweets targeting Maughan in which a former political spokesperson, noting that “we must keep on kicking this dog harder so that her owner who pays her comes out”. These attacks were in response to her recent high-profile reporting on corruption in South Africa. This was intended to dehumanise and insult Maughan, but moreover, to incite physical violence.
International law and standards
Gendered disinformation implicates various rights:(12)
- The misleading gender and sex-based narratives implicate the rights to equality and dignity.
- The intention to deter women from participating and engaging impacts freedom of expression.
- The intersectional nature of the spread of false and harmful sex and race-based narratives that undermine public trust impacts equality, dignity, access to information, and media freedom, among others.
Gendered disinformation manifests in various ways and amplifies OGBV
In its submissions to the UNSR on FreeEx for her report on gendered disinformation, South African civil society organisation Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) referenced several local examples of how gendered disinformation manifests:(13)
- Targeted attacks against female journalists: Journalist Ferial Haffajee faced online dissemination of manipulated images, often portraying her in sexualized contexts, falsely insinuating connections with specific businessmen and government officials. Similarly, journalist Qaanitah Hunter was targeted on X (formerly Twitter) by politicians, accusing her of spreading lies and being financially supported by a “Master.”
- Legal attacks and disinformation campaigns: Journalist Karyn Maughan encountered attempts to silence her through a SLAPP suit, which not only aimed to intimidate her legally but also served as a platform for online bullying and attacks against her. MMA explained that the weaponization of the legal system appears to be intertwined with disinformation campaigns, often with gendered implications.
- Disinformation targeting the LGBTQI community: MMA found that gendered disinformation intersects with the targeting of LGBTQI community members. For instance, a fabricated article purportedly authored by openly gay journalist Eusebius McKaiser was circulated containing homophobic content aimed at exploiting the journalist’s profile to disseminate disinformation against the LGBTQI community.
MMA provided further examples of how disinformation can form part of or magnify different forms of OGBV for example:
- Manipulated content: Instances such as Haffajee’s experience reflect a growing trend of technology-manipulated content, including images, text, videos, or audio, being disseminated without the consent of the depicted individual. MMA submitted that cyber-misogynistic attacks are strategically employed to silence journalists.
- Threats and incitement: MMA highlighted recent tweets targeting Maughan in which a former political spokesperson, noting that “we must keep on kicking this dog harder so that her owner who pays her comes out”. These attacks were in response to her recent high-profile reporting on corruption in South Africa. This was intended to dehumanise and insult Maughan, but moreover, to incite physical violence.
Balancing rights
While tackling mis- and disinformation is clearly critical, regulations are also frequently abused to stifle freedom of expression. Thus, international law is clear that attempts to combat the spread of online dis- and misinformation must not violate the right to freedom of expression:
- ·General prohibitions of expression are not permitted under the ICCPR.(14)
- Any limits placed on online expression, including mis- and disinformation, must pass the three-part test for permissible restrictions to freedom of expression outlined in the ICCPR Article 19(3).
Any limitations on information that is false must be carefully crafted to “minimise chilling effects on potentially beneficial speech”(15) and must not be “weaponized to inhibit women’s cultural, gender and sexual expression and academic freedom, or restrict feminist discourse and women’s organisations.”(16)As such, mandating that states legislate mis- and disinformation can be problematic.
Multi-pronged approaches to address this could include:(17)
- Media and information literacy campaigns;
- Holding digital platforms accountable for appropriate and contextualised content moderation; and
- Providing digital security tools for women journalists, in particular, to report and take action on campaigns made against them.
For more on mis- and disinformation, see the dedicated Module 8: ‘False News’, Misinformation and Propaganda in the Media Defence Resource Hub.
National laws
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the explosion of pandemic-related mis- and disinformation prompted many states, including those in Africa, to pass laws criminalising or otherwise regulating the publishing of mis- or disinformation online. As of December 2023:(18)
- 3 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had dedicated disinformation laws (Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Nigeria).
- 3 were considering drafts (Gambia, Mozambique, and Senegal).
- 84 general speech laws were in effect, which raises concerns regarding a lack of clarity, broad scope, a lack of independent decision-making over the determination of speech, and disproportionate responses.(19)
In Nigeria, the Code of Practice for Interactive Computer Service Platforms/Internet Intermediaries, 2022 requires digital platforms to file an annual compliance report that details rates and take-downs of mis- and disinformation and must provide users with easily accessible tools to report such information. However, the Code has been criticised for threatening freedom of expression in several ways.(20)
Case note: Disinformation implications for free speech
In Federation of African Journalists (FAJ) v. The Gambia (2018) a foundational order given by the Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice (ECOWAS Court) in 2018, provisions in The Gambia’s Criminal Code that provided for criminal sanctions for defamation and false news were held to have violated the right to freedom of expression under international law. The case was brought by the Federation of African Journalists and four Gambian journalists who had been prosecuted and detained under the provisions. The Court ordered The Gambia to amend the Criminal Code to bring it into conformity with the international law position on mis- and disinformation.