{"id":1041,"date":"2022-09-22T11:49:05","date_gmt":"2022-09-22T10:49:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.mediadefence.org\/ereader\/?post_type=publication&p=1041"},"modified":"2022-09-22T12:05:22","modified_gmt":"2022-09-22T11:05:22","slug":"limitation-on-the-right-to-freedom-of-expression","status":"publish","type":"publication","link":"https:\/\/www.mediadefence.org\/ereader\/publications\/modules-on-litigating-freedom-of-expression-and-digital-rights-in-south-and-southeast-asia\/module-3-access-to-the-internet\/limitation-on-the-right-to-freedom-of-expression\/","title":{"rendered":"Limitation on the Right to Freedom of Expression"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In 2016, the UNSR on freedom of expression noted: \u201cThe blocking of Internet platforms and the shutting down of telecommunications infrastructure are persistent threats, for even if they are premised on national security or public order, they tend to block the communications of often millions of individuals\u201d.[footnote]Report of the UNSR on Freedom of Expression to the UNGA, A\/71\/373, 6 September 2016 (2016 Report of the UNSR on Freedom of Expression) at para 22 (accessible at: https:\/\/www.un.org\/ga\/search\/view_doc.asp?symbol=A\/71\/373<\/a>).[\/footnote] This imposes an obvious restriction on the right to freedom of expression, and may further limit a range of other rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2011 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet highlights the egregious nature that these limitations can cause:[footnote]Joint Declaration, Adopted 1 June 2011, para. 6(a) (accessible at: http:\/\/www.law-democracy.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/06\/11.06.Joint-Declaration.Internet.pdf<\/a>).[\/footnote] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c(a)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Mandatory blocking of entire websites, (IP) [internet protocol] addresses, ports, network protocols or types of uses (such as social networking) is an extreme measure \u2013 analogous to banning a newspaper or broadcaster \u2013 which can only be justified in accordance with international standards, for example where necessary to protect children against sexual abuse.<\/p>

(b)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Content filtering systems which are imposed by a government or commercial service provider and which are not end-user controlled are a form of prior censorship and are not justifiable as a restriction on freedom of expression.<\/p>

(c)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Products designed to facilitate end-user filtering should be required to be accompanied by clear information to end-users about how they work and their potential pitfalls in terms of over-inclusive filtering.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Internet and telecommunications shutdowns that involve measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online are a violation of human rights law.[footnote]Id<\/em>. 12 at para. 6(b).[\/footnote] In the 2016 UN Resolution on the Internet, the UN Human Rights Council stated that it \u201ccondemns unequivocally measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online in violation of international human rights law, and calls upon all States to refrain from and cease such measures\u201d[footnote]Id<\/em>. at para 10.[\/footnote]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As set out in General Comment No. 34, adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee:[footnote]General Comment No. 34 at para 43.[\/footnote]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cAny restrictions on the operation of websites, blogs or any other internet-based, electronic or other such information dissemination system, including systems to support such communication, such as internet service providers or search engines, are only permissible to the extent that they are compatible with [article 19(3) of the ICCPR]. Permissible restrictions generally should be content-specific; generic bans on the operation of certain sites and systems are not compatible with [article 19(3) of the ICCPR]. It is also inconsistent with [article 19(3) of the ICCPR] to prohibit a site or an information dissemination system from publishing material solely on the basis that it may be critical of the government or the political social system espoused by the government.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The UNSR on freedom of expression has noted that internet shutdowns are often ordered covertly and without a legal basis, and violate the requirement that restrictions must be provided for in law.[footnote]2017 Report of the UNSR on Freedom of Expression, above n 20 at para 9.[\/footnote] Similarly, shutdowns ordered pursuant to vaguely formulated laws and regulations also fail to satisfy the legality requirement.[footnote]Id.<\/em> at para 10.[\/footnote] In some countries, this has led to the government enacting new laws to expressly allow for shutdowns to take place.[footnote][1] In India, for example, following the internet reportedly having been shut down more than 40 times during the course of 2017, the Department of Telecommunications issued new rules – the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules – in August 2017 allowing the government to shut down telephone and internet services during a public emergency or for public safety. The government had previously relied on section 144 of the Criminal Code that was aimed at preventing \u201cobstruction, annoyance or injury\u201d to impose internet restrictions. This legal development was met with mixed responses. On the one hand, the 2017 rules meant that government shutdowns could arguably be done in a more organised manner. On the other hand, however, concerns were raised about the lack of definitions for the terms \u201cpublic emergency\u201d or \u201cpublic safety\u201d, and the potential that these new rules may have for censorship online. See: for instance, http:\/\/www.hindustantimes.com\/india-news\/govt-issues-first-ever-rules-to-carry-out-internet-shutdowns-in-india\/story-Drn0MnxJAp58RoZoFI7u4L.html<\/a>.) In practice, India\u2019s use of internet shutdowns increased in subsequent years, and India has been criticised for not implementing the requirement under the 2017 Rules to establish a centralised repository of data on internet shutdowns.\u00a0 See Access Now, \u2018The Return of Digital Authoritarianism: Internet Shutdowns in 2021\u2019, above n 26, p. 7.[\/footnote]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UNSR on Freedom of Expression has further noted that network shutdowns invariably fail to meet the standard of necessity,[footnote]2017 Report of the UNSR on freedom of expression above n 20 at para 14.[\/footnote] and are generally disproportionate.[footnote]Id. <\/em>at para 15.[\/footnote] States frequently seek to justify this on the ground of national security, which is discussed further below.\u00a0 For example, according to the digital rights advocacy group, Access Now, 2021 marked the fourth consecutive year that India was responsible for imposing the highest number of internet shutdowns globally, with 106 shutdown incidents recorded in 2021.[footnote]Access Now, \u2018The Return of Digital Authoritarianism: Internet Shutdowns in 2021\u2019, above n 26, p. 2.[\/footnote] According to their research, political instability was the reason for most of India\u2019s 2021 shutdowns (80 cases), followed by protests (9 cases) and communal violence (7 cases).[footnote]Id.<\/em>, p. 14.[\/footnote] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n
The Supreme Court of India on internet shutdowns<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n
\n

The Supreme Court of India considered legality of an internet shutdown in Kashmir in their 2010 judgment in Bhasin v. Union of India<\/em>.[footnote]Supreme Court of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1031\/2019 (2020) (accessible at: https:\/\/main.sci.gov.in\/supremecourt\/2019\/28817\/28817_2019_2_1501_19350_Judgement_10-Jan-2020.pdf<\/a>).[\/footnote] In their reasons, the Court found that a complete shutdown of the internet was a \u2018drastic measure\u2019 that should be \u201cconsidered by the State only if \u2018necessary\u2019 and \u2018unavoidable\u2019\u201d and that the State \u201cmust assess the existence of an alternate less intrusive remedy.\u201d[footnote]Id.<\/em> at para. 99.[\/footnote] The Court also found that any suspension of the internet must meet the requirement of proportionality and not extend longer than necessary.[footnote]Id.<\/em> at paras. 71 & 152(d).[\/footnote]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the Court adopted a circumspect approach towards internet shutdowns, international standards go even further. Under international human rights law, internet shutdowns are always unjustifiable restrictions of freedom of expression.[footnote]2017 Report of the UNSR on freedom of expression above n 20, paras 9-14.[\/footnote]<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

In relation to the blocking and filtering of content, there may indeed be circumstances where such measures are justifiable.\u00a0 For example, in relation to websites distributing child pornography. \u00a0Such measures are still required to meet the three\u2011part test for restrictions, which will need to be assessed on a case\u2011by-case basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarly, limitations to network neutrality may also be permissible in certain circumstances, for example for legitimate network management purposes. \u00a0However, as a general principle, there should be no discrimination in the treatment of internet data and traffic, regardless of the device, content, author, origin and\/or destination of the content, service or application.[footnote]2011 Joint Declaration above n 12 at para. 5(a).[\/footnote] Further, internet intermediaries should be transparent about any traffic or information management practices they employ, and relevant information on such practices should be made available in a form that is accessible to all stakeholders.[footnote]Id.<\/em> at para. 5(b).[\/footnote]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In 2016, the UNSR on freedom of expression noted: \u201cThe blocking of Internet platforms and the shutting down of telecommunications infrastructure are persistent threats, for even if they are premised on national security or public order, they tend to block the communications of often millions of individuals\u201d.[footnote]Report of the UNSR on Freedom of Expression to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"parent":916,"menu_order":75,"template":"page-templates\/chapter.php","publication-category":[],"class_list":["post-1041","publication","type-publication","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nLimitation on the Right to Freedom of Expression | eReader<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" 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