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    Internet Shutdowns

    Module 2: Restricting Access and Content

    Overview of internet shutdowns

    An internet shutdown typically involves the deliberate disruption of internet or electronic communications, to the extent that they become either partially or fully inaccessible or unusable. Internet shutdowns often target a particular population or a specific location with the objective of exerting control over the free flow of information in that area, but they have also sometimes affected entire countries. Internet shutdowns, which are sometimes referred to as a “blackout” or “kill switch,” include full and localised shutdowns, bandwidth throttling, and service-based blocking of two-way communication platforms.(1)

    Internet shutdowns on the rise

    Internet shutdowns are unfortunately on the rise: in 2022 the #KeepItOn coalition documented at least 187 internet shutdowns in 35 countries around the world, compared to 76 in 2016.(2) These figures highlight the rise of this new trend in which governments seek to silence dissenting voices, control information and curb freedom of expression.

    A clear example of this can be seen in Zimbabwe, which experienced internet shutdowns in 2022,(3) despite an interim court ruling in 2019 ordering that internet services be restored after a similar shutdown.(4) Further, there were reports of the quality of internet access being degraded ahead of the 2023 elections.(5) Of additional concern is the protracted duration of the shutdowns. At the time of this module’s latest update, there have been ongoing shutdowns in the Tigray region of Ethiopia for more than 3 years.(6)

    The #KeepItOn coalition is actively monitoring links between elections set to take place in 2024 and has concerningly pinpointed at least 23 countries where there is a significant risk of internet shutdowns occurring during election periods.(7) Mauritania, Togo, Chad, Tanzania, Somaliland, Guinea Bissau, Ghana, Algeria, and South Sudan are on the watchlist for 2024.

    Internet shutdowns are used by states to limit opposition and disarm dissent and are often used during critical periods such as elections or times of mass protest. They pose severe threats to people’s rights and are contrary to international human rights standards.

    International and regional responses

    Over the last decade, the exponential growth in access to the internet has led to the corresponding development of international norms and standards regarding the use of the internet and the various rights it invokes. In the context of internet shutdowns, the rights to freedom of expression, access to information, and association and assembly rights contained in articles 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) are primarily implicated.

    International guidance on this issue goes some time back. In 2011, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression (UNSR on FreeEx) reported to the United Nations General Assembly that:

    “the Internet has become a key means by which individuals can exercise their right to freedom of opinion and expression, as guaranteed by article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”(8)

    In 2012, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) unanimously adopted a Resolution to protect the free speech of individuals on the internet. This Resolution was the first of its kind and notably called upon states to “promote and facilitate access to the Internet.” It affirmed that:

    “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice, in accordance with articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.(9)

    In recent years there have been more explicit statements concerning internet shutdowns:

    • In 2016, the UNHRC expressed deep concern regarding “measures aiming to or that intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online, in violation of international human rights law.”(10)
    • In 2017, the UNSR on FreeEx reported that “Internet and telecommunications shutdowns involve measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online in violation of human rights law,”(11) explaining further that shutdowns “ordered covertly or without an obvious legal basis violate the requirement of Article 19(3) of the [ICCPR] that restrictions be ‘provided by law’.”
    • In 2018, the UNHRC expressed its deep concern “at measures in violation of international human rights law that aim to or that intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online.”(12)
    • In 2019, the UNSR on FreeEx reiterated that internet shutdowns are clearly inconsistent with article 19(3) of the ICCPR.(13)
    • In 2020, the UNHRC strongly condemned the use of internet shutdowns “to intentionally and arbitrarily prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online.”(14)
    • In June 2022, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights presented a report to the UN General Assembly highlighting the severe human rights impacts of internet shutdowns, including the fact that they “very rarely meet the fundamental requirements of necessity and proportionality,” and providing a set of recommendations for ending shutdowns, including calling on states to refrain from the full range of internet shutdowns.(15)
    • In October 2022 the UNSR on FreeEx presented a report concerning the protection of freedom of expression during armed conflict, noting that internet shutdowns undermine human rights and are not legitimate warfare tactics.(16)
    • In 2023, UN experts raised alarm on internet shutdowns in Gaza that are disrupting essential communications and reporting on the conflict.(17)
    • In the 2023 Report to the UNHRC, the UNSR on FreeEx noted that internet shutdowns continue to occur with severe impacts on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly as well as on economic and social rights such as education, health, and essential online services like financial services.(18) The report highlighted that the intentional disruption of access to the internet constitutes a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression and has been considered by various UN human rights mechanisms and regional courts to be a violation of international human rights law.

    Decisive regional law on access to the internet

    In her 2023 report, the UNSR on FreeEx most notably cites the case of SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2022) in the Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Court), which held that the Nigerian government had violated the right to freedom of expression, access to information, and of the media by suspending the operations of social media platform Twitter in the country. Also of note is the fact that the UNSR of FreeEx submitted an amicus curiae brief in that matter, which clearly set out the international law position. (Available here.)

    In an African context, the 2019 Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa provides that:(19):

    “States shall not interfere with the right of individuals to seek, receive and impart information through any means of communication and digital technologies, through measures such as the removal, blocking or filtering of content, unless such interference is justifiable and compatible with international human rights law and standards.

    States shall not engage in or condone any disruption of access to the internet and other digital technologies for segments of the public or an entire population.”

    African bodies have also explicitly expressed their condemnation of internet shutdowns:

    • In 2019, the ACHPR’s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information expressed concern about the continuing trend of internet shutdowns in Africa and noted that shutdowns violate the right to freedom of expression and access to information contrary to Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.(20)
    • In 2020, the ACHPR Special Rapporteur again expressed his concern about internet shutdowns in Africa, stressing the importance of internet access for containing the spread of COVID-19 and enabling journalists to verify the information and update the public on measures governments were taking to deal with the virus.(21)
    • In 2023 the ACHPR Special Rapporteur, together with other regional and international Special Rapporteurs, issued a joint declaration on Media Freedom and Democracy in which they implore States to refrain from imposing internet shutdowns and thereby prevent access to information, undermining journalistic work, and abet the perpetration of human rights violations.(22)

    The above standards make it clear that internet shutdowns result in rights violations, and these reports and resolutions are important for establishing the rights-based framework relating to internet shutdowns. The practicality of litigating against states requires a nuanced understanding of the international human rights standards of legality, necessity, and proportionality and when there can be reasonable and justifiable limitations on fundamental human rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression.

    Legality, necessity and proportionality

    Central to litigating internet shutdowns is establishing that the measure violates the right to freedom of expression and access to information, among others, such as the right to health and education. As discussed above, internet shutdowns violate the full enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression. However, since freedom of expression is not an absolute right, it may be limited in certain circumstances, but only when, according to international human rights law, the limitation is “provided by law” and “necessary” to ensure “respect of the rights or reputation of others” or for “the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”(23)

    States often rely on this exception of “national security” or “public order” to justify internet shutdowns. When litigating the issue of internet shutdowns, it is important to conduct a thorough limitations analysis in order to illustrate to a court that a right has been infringed and that the limitation does not meet the threshold of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.

    Note on the limitation of freedom of expression

    Article 19(3) of ICCPR sets out the grounds upon which the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas on the internet may be limited. The restriction must be:

    1. Provided by law.
    2. Be necessary for:
      • Respect for the rights of others.
      • The protection of national security or of public order (ordrepublic), or of public health or morals.
        • These are understood as the “legitimate grounds for restrictions”.

    The UNHRC, through General Comment 34, has given further scope to the understanding of Article 19(3):(24)

    The restrictions must be provided by law: (25)

    • The law must be clear (be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly) and accessible, and apply equally to everyone.
    • The law must also be consistent with international human rights law.
    • It must provide sufficient guidance on remedies and procedures for challenging non-compliance with the law.
    • It is for the state to demonstrate the legal basis for any restrictions imposed on freedom of expression.

    Directions or instructions from state departments or actors are insufficient to meet this legality threshold.

    The restriction must be necessary:

    • It must respect the rights or reputations of others. The UNHRC explains that for example, it may be legitimate to restrict freedom of expression in order to protect the right to vote. The UNHRC cautions that restrictions must be constructed with care: while it may be permissible to protect voters from forms of expression that constitute intimidation or coercion, such restrictions must not impede political debate, including, for example, calls for the boycotting of a non-compulsory vote.
    • It must be aimed at the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Here the UNHRC explains that restrictive laws used for the pursuit of national security cannot be used to suppress or withhold from the public information of legitimate public interest if it does not harm national security. Journalists, researchers, environmental activists, human rights defenders, or others cannot be prosecuted for having disseminated such information if it does not harm national security. Relying on the justification of national security to stifle advocacy and activism is prohibited and merely alleging the justification of national security is insufficient.

    The UNHRC explains further that the above grounds must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality:(26)

    • Restrictions must be “necessary” for a legitimate purpose.
    • Restrictions must not be overbroad. The UNHRC emphasised that restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality:
      • They must be appropriate to achieve their protective function.
      • They must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function.
      • They must be proportionate to the interest to be protected.
      • The principle of proportionality must be respected not only in the law that frames the restrictions but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law.

    Internet shutdowns are seldom proportionate, and are generally viewed as a “disproportionate restriction on the right to freedom of expression, and have serious repercussions for the protection of other human rights.”

    IIf a state cannot fulfil these requirements, then the restriction amounts to an unjustifiable and disproportionate limitation of the right. Echoing this and responding to the internet shutdown crisis in Kashmir in 2019, several UN Special Rapporteurs recorded that “[t]he shutdown of the internet and telecommunication networks, without justification from the Government, are inconsistent with the fundamental norms of necessity and proportionality.”(27)

    Recent examples of litigation relating to internet shutdowns

    Despite these clear standards, states continue to claim that measures taken to restrict the internet are necessary and proportionate to ensure national security or public order, or both. Fortunately, there have been instances in which courts have handed down decisions providing that these justifications do not warrant internet shutdowns and where the threat of litigation itself has proved successful.

    Domestic Courts

    Cameroon

    In 2017, a case was brought before the Constitutional Council in Cameroon which challenged the state’s decision state to shut down the internet in the South West and North West of the country the majority English-speaking regions — following language-related protests.(28) Civil society actors filed a challenge demanding that the state restore access to the internet in these regions,(29) after which access to the internet was restored without the need for a judicial determination.(30) As stated by Access Now, this showed that “simply filing the lawsuit can get results, like increased transparency and responsiveness from telcos or the state.”(31)

    In a subsequent legal challenge brought before the Supreme Court of Cameroon, sitting as the Constitutional Council of Cameroon, seeking a declaratory judgment on the internet shutdown, the court dismissed the application for lack of locus standi, noting that the Constitution does not empower civil society organisations to file matters before it.(32)

    Zimbabwe

    In January 2019, an urgent chamber application was filed by Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and the Media Institute of Southern Africa-Zimbabwe Chapter (MISA-Zimbabwe) challenging the ongoing internet shutdowns in Zimbabwe at that time, which were reportedly imposed in response to mass political protests and to provide cover for security forces to implement a violent crackdown.(33) The High Court granted an interim order that the implicated mobile operator must immediately and unconditionally resume full services and thus ensure access to the internet.(34) The Court’s ruling was mainly based on the absence of a legal provision enabling the shutdown.

    While this resulted in the eventual restoration of access, internet shutdowns in Zimbabwe have persisted in the intervening years. For example, there were internet shutdowns again in 2022(35) and once more in 2023 ahead of elections in the country.(36)

    Zambia

    In August 2021, internet access was shut down during the Zambian general elections. The incumbent president ostensibly conducted this shutdown “in an effort to maintain peace and during the voting period.” This led a Zambian NGO, Chapter One Foundation, to approach the High Court to review the Zambian Information and Communications Technology Authority’s decision to interrupt internet access. (37)

    The parties ultimately came to an agreement, which was made an order of court by the High Court, whereby the Zambian Information and Communications Technology Authority:

    “would not do any act or make any omission outside of their legal regulatory authority which may inhibit or interrupt the flow of an uninhibited access to information on all available telecommunication platforms under their control and/or regulation where the interest of consumers and their consumer and constitutional rights are threatened.”

    Further, and importantly for government accountability, the Information and Communications Technology Authority agreed to inform the public as to the cause of any internet disruption within 36 hours of the event.

    Sudan

    After an internet shutdown in the country in 2019, a Sudanese lawyer launched a legal challenge that successfully resulted in an order for the service provider to restore his access.(38) However, the order did not extend beyond his single SIM card due to his filing the suit in his personal capacity as a customer. This was then followed by a class action suit which eventually resulted in the court ordering multiple service providers to restore access for all customers, as well as provide apologies to their customers.

    In a subsequent lawsuit brought in 2021 against another shutdown, the Sudanese Consumer Protection Organisation succeeded in securing an order for all internet service providers (ISPs) to restore access for all subscribers.(39) When the Telecommunication and Post Regulatory Authority (TPRA) insisted on maintaining the shutdown despite the court order on the grounds of national security, the court issued a warrant of arrest for the chief executives of the ISPs which finally resulted in access being restored.

    Uganda

    Unfortunately, some domestic legal challenges have not proven successful. In 2021 the Ugandan Constitutional Court dismissed an application challenging the government’s disruption of internet as well as mobile money services in the country during the 2016 general elections. The court held that the shutdown was permissible by law and involved no constitutional issues.(40)

    Regional Courts

    Nigeria

    In 2021, the federal government suspended social media site Twitter after it removed content posted by President Muhammadu Buhari which threatened to punish regional secessionists.(41) The ban was in place for seven months before Twitter agreed to several of the government’s demands, including opening a local office in Nigeria.

    The ban was subsequently challenged in the ECOWAS Court in a case brought by the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) and joined with other similar cases. The Court held that access to Twitter was a “derivative right” that was “complementary to the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression.” As such, any derogation from that right must be lawfully justified by either an existing law or an order of the Court, something which the government had failed to show.

    Consequently, the Court held that the ban violated the right to freedom of expression, access to information and the media as set out in Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) and Article 19 of the ICCPR. It further ordered the government to prevent such a repetition. Media Defence and Mojirayo Ogunlana-Nkanga represented the applicants.(42)

    Guinea

    In 2020, the Guinean government disrupted access to the internet and banned demonstrations as well as arrested demonstrators, journalists, and civil society activists amidst protests concerning the President’s amendment of the Constitution that would effectively allow him to remain in power. Consequently, an NGO brought a case to the ECOWAS Court on the basis that the government had violated their right to freedom of expression and right to information.(43)

    The Applicants argued that the government’s actions in shutting down the internet violated Article 9 of the African Charter, Paragraph 19 of the ICCPR, and Paragraph 66 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty.

    The Court noted that the aim of the right to information is to enable citizens to participate usefully in the democratic process and in decisions concerning their future. Access to information is considered the foundation of democracy. It held that the right to information is an extension of freedom of the press and freedom of expression and that any unjustified measure which aims to suspend or restrict free access to information constitutes a violation of the right to information. As such, the government’s actions in interrupting access to the internet without justification constituted a violation of the right to information.

    Similarly, the Court held that the right to freedom of expression is an essential right which guarantees the exercise of freedom of the press and is a necessary and indispensable element of any democratic society. Importantly, the Court found that states not only have an obligation to refrain from interfering with this right, but they also must adopt all necessary measures to give effect to it. It emphasised that any restriction or limitation to the right to freedom of expression is only justified if it is provided by law, serves a legitimate interest, is necessary and proportionate, and respects the rights of others, the collective security, morality, and the common interest. The government did not meet these requirements and, as such, they were found to have violated the Applicants’ right to freedom of expression. Guinea was ordered to take all necessary measures to ensure that these violations do not occur in the future and to adopt and implement laws, regulations, and safeguards to fulfil its obligations regarding the right to freedom of expression under international human rights instruments.

    Togo

    In 2017, the Togolese government enacted an internet shutdown in response to protests over President Faure Gnassingbé’s efforts to pursue a fourth term in power. Seven local CSOs, including Amnesty International Togo and an individual blogger-activist, applied to the ECOWAS Court arguing a violation of Article 9 of the African Charter, as well as that the shutdown prevented their ability to carry out their work and damaged their reputation and finances.(44)

    The government justified the shutdown in terms of national security, claiming that there was a spread of hate speech and incitement online which risked a civil war. As described by the Global Freedom of Expression Database at Columbia University:

    “The Court found that access to the internet is a “derivative right” as it “enhances the exercise of freedom of expression.” As such, internet access is “a right that requires protection of the law” and any interference with it “must be provided for by the law specifying the grounds for such interference.” [p. 11] As there was no national law upon which the right to internet access could be derogated from, the Court concluded that the internet was not shut down in accordance with the law and the Togolese government had violated Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Court subsequently ordered the Respondent State of Togo to take measures to guarantee the “non-occurrence” of a future similar situation, implement laws to meet their obligations with the right to freedom of expression and compensate each applicant to the sum of 2,000,000 CFA (approx. 3,500 USD).”

    The Court also established that non-natural persons, including CSOs, can bring claims to protect their right to freedom of expression in the ECOWAS Court.(45)

    Benin: a case study on the importance of procedure

    In 2019 the government of Benin shut down internet access on the day of legislative elections. This sparked several individuals to bring a case to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court), where they argued that the shutdown violated their right to freedom of opinion and expression in terms of Article 19 of the UDHR.(46)

    In 2023, the court delivered its judgment, ultimately dismissing the case as the Applicants did not meet admissibility requirements. This judgement serves as an important reminder of the importance of complying with procedure in litigation.

    Notably, the Court held that the Applicants did not exhaust all local remedies available to them before approaching the Court, and failed to provide sufficient evidence showing that local remedies were unavailable or ineffective. Therefore, the Court found the application to be inadmissible.

    Tips to consider when litigating this issue

    Several resources are available providing guidelines and tips on how to litigation internet shutdowns in Africa, dealing with practical issues such as the documentation of evidence and procedural steps:

    For election-related shutdowns, Access Now’s election toolkit provides guidance on how to prevent and respond to internet shutdowns.

    A guide from the Southern African Litigation Centre also highlights the legal considerations for legal action on internet shutdowns in various courts in the region:

    • The parties: consider the impact of the shutdown and whether it is necessary to identify specific categories of applicants and respondents. Identify who is responsible for ordering the shutdown and who implemented it.
    • The procedure and the relief: consider if the case requires urgent litigation and interdicts, injunctions, or judicial reviews. Consider the type of precedent the case will set.
    • The law: consider whether there are existing laws that prescribe blockage orders. If there are, consider whether the government has complied with them and consider if the laws themselves are in accordance with human rights standards.
    • The rights: consider which rights were violated and consider responses to government justifications.

    The growing number of shutdowns internationally and in Africa is of grave concern. Fortunately, there is a simultaneous growth of activism and litigation that is working towards curbing these continued rights violations, and progress has been made in recent years in developing domestic and regional jurisprudence condemning such shutdowns, as well as in the publication of international law instruments and guidance that can be referenced to show the firm international human rights law position on the subject. However, until states refrain from blanket bans over access to the internet through shutdowns, there will be a continued need for strategic litigation, activism, and advocacy.

    More Resources on Internet Shutdowns

    Footnotes

    1. See Access Now, ‘What is an internet shutdown?’ (2019) (accessible at https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/) and Media Defence, ‘Training Manual on Digital Rights and Freedom of Expression Online’. See further Access Now, ‘Launching STOP: the #KeepItOn internet shutdown tracker’ (2017) (accessible at https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-shutdown-tracker/) and Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, ‘The Anatomy of an Internet Blackout: Measuring the Economic Impact of Internet Shutdowns in India’ (2018) (accessible at https://icrier.org/pdf/Anatomy_of_an_Internet_Blackout.pdf). Back
    2. Access Now, ‘#KeepItOn’ (accessible at https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/). Back
    3. Access Now, ‘Zimbabwe elections 2023: voters need internet access’ (2023) (accessible at https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/zimbabwe-elections-2023/). Back
    4. Access Now, ‘Zimbabwe orders a three-day, country-wide internet shutdown’ (2019) (accessible at https://www.accessnow.org/zimbabwe-orders-a-three-day-country-wide-internet-shutdown/). Back
    5. Reliefweb, ‘Zimbabwe: Elections marred by arbitrary arrests and fears of internet shutdown” (2023) (accessible at https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-elections-marred-arbitrary-arrests-and-fears-internet-shutdown). Back
    6. Access Now, ‘Who is shutting down the internet in 2023? A mid-year update’ (2023) (accessible at https://www.accessnow.org/publication/internet-shutdowns-in-2023-mid-year-update/#join-us). Back
    7. Access Now, ‘2024 elections and internet shutdown watch’ (2024) (accessible at https://www.accessnow.org/campaign/2024-elections-and-internet-shutdowns-watch/#watchlist). Back
    8. UNHRC, ‘Report of UNSR of FreeEx’ (2011) (accessible at https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf). Back
    9. UNHRC, ‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the internet: Resolution’ (2012) (accessible at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/731540?ln=en). Back
    10. UNHRC, ‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the internet: draft resolution’ (2016) (accessible at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/845728?ln=en). Back
    11. UNHRC, ‘Report on UNSR on FreeEx’ (2017) (accessible at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/077/46/PDF/G1707746.pdf?OpenElement). Back
    12. UNHRC, ‘Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 5 July 2018’ (2018) (accessible at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1639840?ln=zh_CN). Back
    13. UN General Assembly, ‘Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression’ (2019) (accessible at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Opinion/A_74_486.pdf). Back
    14. ARTICLE 19, ‘HRCC: Un resolution on freedom of opinion and expression’ (2020) (accessible at https://www.article19.org/resources/hrc44-un-resolution-on-freedom-of-expression/). Back
    15. UNHRC, ‘Internet shutdowns: trends, causes, legal implications and impacts on a range of human rights – Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (2022) (accessible at https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5055-internet-shutdowns-trends-causes-legal-implications-and-impacts). Back
    16. UN Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Protect freedom of expression as a vital survival right of civilians in armed conflict: UN expert’ (2023) (accessible at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/protect-freedom-expression-vital-survival-right-civilians-armed-conflict-un). Back
    17. UN Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Gaza is running out of time UN experts warn, demanding a ceasefire to prevent genocide’ (2023) (accessible at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/11/gaza-running-out-time-un-experts-warn-demanding-ceasefire-prevent-genocide). Back
    18. UNHRC, ‘UNSR on FreeEx: Report on sustainable development and freedom of expression: why voice matters’ (2023) (accessible at https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A/HRC/53/25). Back
    19. African Declaration, available at: https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/. Back
    20. ACHPR, ‘Press Release by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa on the Continuing Trend of Internet and Social Media Shutdowns in Africa’ (2019) (accessible at https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2019-01-29/press-release-special-rapporteur-freedom-expression-and-access-0). Back
    21. ACHPR, ‘Press Release by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa on the Importance of Access to the Internet in Respondent to the COVID-19’ (2020) (accessible at https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2020-04-08/press-release-special-rapporteur-freedom-expression). Back
    22. ACHPR, ‘Joint Declaration on Media Freedom and Democracy’ (2023) (accessible at https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2023-05-04/joint-declaration-media-freedom-and-democracy). Back
    23. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (accessible at https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights). Back
    24. UNHRC, ‘General Comment 34: Article 19 Freedoms of opinion and expression’ (2011) (accessible at https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf). Back
    25. The UNSR FreeEx 2019 Report explains that “The restriction must be provided by laws that are precise, public and transparent; it must avoid providing authorities with unbounded discretion, and appropriate notice must be given to those whose speech is being regulated. Rules should be subject to public comment and regular legislative or administrative processes. Procedural safeguards, especially those guaranteed by independent courts or tribunals, should protect rights.” Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Opinion/A_74_486.pdf. Back
    26. The UNHRC explains: “Fundamentally, any restriction or limitation must not undermine or jeopardise the right to freedom of expression itself. Additionally, restrictions must be consistent with other rights found in the ICCPR and the fundamental principles found in the UDHR.” See UNHRC, ‘General Comment 34′, accessible here: https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf. Back
    27. UN Office of the High Commissioner, ‘UN rights experts urge India to end communications shutdown in Kashmir’ (2019) (accessible at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/08/un-rights-experts-urge-india-end-communications-shutdown-kashmir). Back
    28. Al Jazeera, ‘Cameroon internet shutdowns cost Anglophones millions’ (2018) (accessible at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/1/26/cameroon-internet-shutdowns-cost-anglophones-millio). Back
    29. Media Defence, ‘Media Defence and Veritas Law Bring Case Before the Constitutional Council of Cameroon Challenging Internet Shutdown,’ (2017) (accessible at https://www.mediadefence.org/news/mldi-and-veritas-law-bring-case-before-the-constitutional-council-of-cameroon-challenging-internet-shutdown/). Back
    30. Media Defence along with Veritas Law were the applicants challenging the internet shutdown. Media Defence stated: “The case that has been brought highlights that open and accessible internet communications are essential to ensuring the right to freedom of expression. Disruption of online services, whether through website blocking or internet shutdowns, amounts to a serious violation of that fundamental right. The government of Cameroon is obliged under domestic and international legal obligations to protect freedom of expression, including ensuring that it remains accessible and that people are able to use it freely and without interference.” Back
    31. AccessNow, ‘Judges raise the gavel to #KeepItOn around the world,’ (2019) (accessible at https://www.accessnow.org/judges-raise-the-gavel-to-keepiton-around-the-world/). Back
    32. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, ‘Zim Court Hears Challenge of Internet Blockade’ (2019) (accessible at https://www.zlhr.org.zw/?p=1626). Back
    33. Bloomburg, ‘Zimbabwe Lawyers Sue Mobile Operators Over Internet Shutdown’ (2019) (accessible at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-21-zimbabwe-lawyers-sue-mobile-operators-over-internet-shutdown/). Back
    34. Access Now, ‘Zimbabwe elections 2023: voters need internet access’ (2023) (accessible at https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/zimbabwe-elections-2023/). Back
    35. Reliefweb, ‘Zimbabwe: Elections marred by arbitrary arrests and fears of internet shutdown’ (2023) (accessible at https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-elections-marred-arbitrary-arrests-and-fears-internet-shutdown). Back
    36. Chapter One Foundation v. Zambian Information and Communications Technology Authority (2021) (accessible at https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/chapter-one-foundation-v-zambian-information-and-communications-technology-authority/). Back
    37. CIPESA, ‘Litigating Internet Disruptions in Africa: Lessons from Sudan,’ (2022) (accessible at https://cipesa.org/2022/03/litigating-internet-disruptions-in-africa-lessons-from-sudan/). Back
    38. Id. Back
    39. The Independent, ‘Constitutional court dismisses petition challenging internet, mobile money shutdown during elections,’ (2021) (accessible at https://www.independent.co.ug/constitutional-court-dismisses-petition-challenging-internet-mobile-money-shutdown-during-elections/). See also the brief on the Columbia Case Law Database, accessible at https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/unwanted-witness-uganda-v-attorney-general/ Back
    40. Al Jazeera, ‘Nigeria ends its Twitter ban after seven months’ (2022) (accessible at https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/1/12/nigeria-ends-its-twitter-ban-after-seven-months). Back
    41. Association des Blogueurs de Guinée and Others v. State of Guinea (2023) (accessible at
      https://africanlii.org/akn/aa-ecowas/judgment/ecowascj/2023/1/eng@2023-10-31).
      Back
    42. Global Freedom of Expression: Columbia University, ‘Amnesty International Togo and Ors v. The Togolese Republic,’ (2020) (accessible at https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/amnesty-international-togo-and-ors-v-the-togolese-republic/). Back
    43. Id. Access Now, which intervened in the case as a friend of the court along with a group of other CSOs, stated: “The ECOWAS Togo decision is generally consistent with existing international law, such as Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC)’s General Comment No. 34 on Article 19 ICCPR, which state that no internet restrictions are permissible unless they are provided by law. However, the court did not address the necessity and proportionality requirements outlined in General Comment No. 34, including that any restrictions on the freedom of expression, such as internet shutdowns, “must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function.” This is the key question that should be asked whenever a government is contemplating shutting down an entire internet network or service: would a less harmful step be effective? Nevertheless, the court did order the government of Togo to enact the law protecting freedom of expression that would be consistent with international human rights instruments in the future. This means that the Togolese government should enact legislation protecting its citizens’ rights from any disproportionate restrictions on their expression.” Back
    44. Adelakoun and Others v Republic of Benin (2023) (accessible at https://africanlii.org/akn/aa-au/judgment/afchpr/2023/48/eng@2023-12-04). Back